Transactions on Transport Sciences 2008, 1(2):61-68 | DOI: 10.5507/tots.2008.009

Interpretation of the Galileo Safety-of-Life Service by Means of Railway RAMS Terminology

A. Filip*,1, J. Beugin1, J. Marais1, H. Mocek2
1 INRETS, Villeneuve d'Ascq, France
2 Czech Railways, TÚČD - Laboratory of Intelligent Systems, Pardubice, Czech Republic

The Galileo Safety of Life (SoL) - Level A service has been designed mainly to support aeronautical operations ranging from en-route up to approach with vertical guidance (APV II). This is why the Galileo SoL Service has been specified by means of quality criteria coming from ICAO's (International Civil Aviation Organization) Required Navigation Performance (RNP) concept, i.e., in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability. However, Galileo SoL - Level A service is also intended for railway signalling which is based on a different safety philosophy. The objective of this paper is to describe links among the Galileo quality criteria and the quality attributes of railway signalling systems (RAMS), according to the CENELEC standards EN 50126, EN 50129 and EN IEC 61508. This paper provides a basic theory and methodology for the employment of the GNSS quality attributes for practical design, validation and verification of railway safety systems based on GNSS. It has been shown that, in spite of the different safety philosophies used in aviation and railway safety systems, the Galileo SoL - Level A service can be described by means of RAMS terminology according to railway standards.

Keywords: Galileo, RAMS, satellite navigation, safety, railway signalling.

Published: June 1, 2008  Show citation

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Filip, A., Beugin, J., Marais, J., & Mocek, H. (2008). Interpretation of the Galileo Safety-of-Life Service by Means of Railway RAMS Terminology. Transactions on Transport Sciences1(2), 61-68. doi: 10.5507/tots.2008.009
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References

  1. EN 50126, 2002. The Specification and Demonstration of Dependability - Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS).
  2. EN 50129, 2003. Railway applications: Safety related electronic systems for signalling.
  3. EN IEC 61508 (1-7), 2002. Functional Safety of electrical/electronic/ programmable electronic safety-related system.
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